Power infrastructure sector reforms, Power Generation, and Private Investments: Case Study from Ghana's Power Sector by Owusu-Manu, D. et al.
1 
 
Power Infrastructure Sector Reforms, Power Generation and Private Investments: A Case 1 
Study from Ghana’s Power Sector 2 
Owusu-Manu1, D., Pärn2, E.A., Kutin-Mensah3, E.K., Edwards4, D.J,  3 
 4 
1PhD, Senior Lecturer,  5 
Department of Building Technology,  6 
College of Art and Built Environment,  7 
Faculty of Built Environment 8 
Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology,  9 
Kumasi-Ghana 10 
Email: d.owusumanu@gmail.com  11 
 12 
 2 BSc(Hons), Lecturer 13 
Faculty of Technology Environment and Engineering 14 
Birmingham City University, United Kingdom 15 
Email: Erika.Pärn@bcu.ac.uk  16 
 17 
1MPhil, Associate Researcher 18 
Department of Building Technology,  19 
College of Art and Built Environment,  20 
Faculty of Built Environment 21 
Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology,  22 
Kumasi-Ghana 23 
Email: bonniflexz@yahoo.com 24 
 25 
 26 
 4PhD, Professor  27 
Faculty of Technology Environment and Engineering 28 
Birmingham City University, United Kingdom 29 
Email: David.Edwards@bcu.ac.uk 30 
 31 
  32 
2 
 
Power Infrastructure Sector Reforms, Power Generation and Private Investments: A Case 33 
Study from Ghana’s Power Sector 34 
 35 
Abstract: This paper assesses the impact of power infrastructure investments in the developing 36 
economy of Ghana following sector restructure and reform and develops a forecasting model for 37 
predicting the future trend in electricity generation and electricity tariff. Secondary data sourced 38 
via the World Bank PPIAF/PPI Project Database for the period 1994 to 2013 and Energy 39 
Commission for the period 2000 to 2014 were used to analyze Ghana’s power generation 40 
statistics using descriptive, exploratory data analysis and polynomial prediction models. Results 41 
reveal that reform has stimulated independent power producer (IPP) investment, particularly in 42 
thermal generation capacities to complement hydro alternatives. It is predicted that in the 43 
medium term the electricity tariff will continue to rise while electricity generation will decline if 44 
additional investments in power infrastructure are not made. This paper provides a case study 45 
that critically appraises Ghana’s power sector reform; exposes the gap between policy 46 
implementation and policy objectives attainment; and proposes a simple yet novel polynomial 47 
prediction model that can facilitate short-to-medium term planning of generation and tariff 48 
management.  49 
 50 
Keywords: Private investments; private sector participation; restructuring; power sector reform; 51 
independent power producers; models; forecasting. 52 
 53 
Introduction  54 
Preserving energy security is crucial for promoting economic development and improving social 55 
equality in developing countries (Stern, 2002; EU, 2006; Finon and Locatelli, 2007). Within 56 
Ghana, population expansion and sustained economic growth at 6-7% annually has created an 57 
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insatiable demand for electricity since 1990 with residential and commercial sectors accounting 58 
for 70% of total consumption (World Bank, 2013). Among the various electricity generation 59 
options, hydropower has traditionally dominated and constitutes 69% of the energy mix for 60 
industry and services sectors (Foster and Pushak, 2011; World Bank, 2013; Gand, 2009; IMF, 61 
2012). However, global climatic change and specifically, drought threatens Ghana’s energy 62 
security and has engendered successive governments to diminish an over-reliance upon 63 
hydropower in preference for thermal power generation. Thermal electricity now contributes 64 
almost half of the reliable generation capacity but further diversification is inevitable (World 65 
Bank, 2013; Foster and Pushak, 2011). For example, gas-fired thermal generation is 66 
progressively replacing unreliable hydropower or costly oil-fired generation (World Bank, 2013; 67 
Ashong, 2010; Malgas, 2008). Compared to other African developing countries, Ghana has 68 
progressed its energy infrastructure development aspirations - as exhibited by improvements in 69 
generation capacity (Eberhard et al., 2011; Banerjee et al., 2009; Gwillliam et al., 2008; World 70 
Bank, 2013). Moreover, independent power producers (IPPs) now form an integral part of 71 
Ghana’s sustainable power policy reform and collaborate with government to facilitate additional 72 
generation capacity (IFC, 2012). Yet, despite progress made, considerable challenges persistently 73 
confront Ghana, including: irregular maintenance and underperformance of generation plants; 74 
transmission failures; underinvestment; overridden debt; and operational inefficiencies 75 
(Gramlich, 1994; Badu et al., 2012; UNECA, 2011; World Bank, 2013). Given these prevailing 76 
challenges, the Ghanaian government has orchestrated sweeping power generation restructure 77 
including: separating the technical functions of production, transmission and distribution; 78 
withdrawing from the market to encourage private investment; creating a competitive market 79 
structure thus ensuring competition; issuing shares ownership of utility companies via stock 80 
4 
 
markets to raise necessary finance; and establishing independent legislative and regulatory 81 
framework to oversee the sector (e.g., the Public Utilities and Regulatory Commission, the 82 
Energy Commission Pursuant to the Public Utilities and Regulatory Commission Act, 1997 (Act 83 
538) and the Energy Commission Act, 1997 (Act 541)) (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983; Jamasb 84 
and Pollitt, 2005; Newbury, 2000; Pollitt, 2004; Eberhard and Gratwick, 2011; Andersen and 85 
Sitter, 2009; Badu et al., 2012; UNECA, 2011). The government’s ambition being to achieve 86 
universal access to electricity by 2020 and become West Africa’s leading exporter of power 87 
(IMF, 2012; Badu et al., 2012; UNECA, 2011; Andersen and Sitter, 2009; World Bank/IFC, 88 
2010).    89 
 90 
However, whilst the literature is replete with commentaries on power sector reforms at both 91 
national and international levels (Joskow, 2006; Erdogdu, 2013; Joskow, 2000; Newbury, 2000; 92 
Pollitt, 2004; Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005; Ishii and Yan 2004), studies that measure the impact of 93 
these reforms in developing countries are desperately needed. This research therefore: analyzes 94 
the trend of power infrastructure investments in Ghana’s power sector post reform; assesses the 95 
ensuing impact upon promoting private investments; and develops a simple but novel polynomial 96 
prediction model that can forecast the future trend in electricity generation and electricity tariff. 97 
This critical literature review and complementary synthesis and analysis of data affords valuable 98 
information to Ghana’s policymakers to reform and shape future policies for attracting greater 99 
private sector investment. 100 
 101 
 102 
 103 
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Infrastructure Investments in Ghana’s Power Sector: An Overview   104 
Public funds, donor assistance and concessionary loans have traditionally afforded the key 105 
sources of finance for power generation projects in West Africa (c.f. PSIRU, 2012; Shingore, 106 
2009; Eberhard et al., 2009; Banerjee et al., 2009; Gwillliam et al., 2008). Investment attracted is 107 
often insufficient for developing major power projects that are inherently capital intensive (Badu 108 
et al., 2012; OECD, 2012; Shingore, 2009; IMF, 2012). Notwithstanding prevailing investment 109 
constraints, successive governments have progressed energy infrastructure developments when 110 
compared to other developing countries in Africa. During in the mid-2000s, 44.3% of Ghana’s 111 
population had access to electricity, when compared to 15.4% for low-income countries such as 112 
Togo and Benin and 59.9% for middle-income countries such as Nigeria and South Africa 113 
(Eberhard et al., 2009; Banerjee et al., 2009; Gwillliam et al., 2008). Despite this progress, 114 
enormous challenges confront the sector (Gramlich, 1994; Badu et al., 2012; UNECA, 2011). 115 
For example, the Volta River Authority (VRA) and Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG) face 116 
weakened financial stability (e.g. net losses, rising receivables and inter-utility debts) and are 117 
unable to undertake new investments or rehabilitate aging power generation and distribution 118 
infrastructure projects. VRA remains reliant upon government loans and other external credit 119 
sources to buy crude oil for operating its grossly underperforming thermal plants at Takoradi and 120 
Tema. Similarly, the Akosombo and Kpong hydro plants are inadequately maintained. The ECG 121 
is currently investing US$100 million annually vis-a-vis an estimated US$200 million needed to 122 
meet minimum investment requirements (World Bank, 2013). Long-term investment forecasts 123 
anticipate that US$1 billion is required to upgrade the transmission infrastructure during the 124 
period 2010–2020, with most investments taking place during 2015 (ibid). Due to its financial 125 
strength, Ghana Grid Company (GRIDCo) plans to raise private finance without government 126 
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guarantee to execute its ambitious investment plans to upgrade its transmission systems (ibid). 127 
However, power transmission debts owed by ECG and the Volta Aluminum Company (VALCO) 128 
have exerted a toll upon GRIDCo’s profitability (ibid)  129 
 130 
To end the recurrent cycle of load shedding, additional investments are needed to increase 131 
existing generation capacity and upgrade existing transmission and distribution plants (IMF, 132 
2012; World Bank, 2013). Load shedding is a method of reducing demand on energy generation 133 
system by temporarily switching off energy distribution to different regions of Ghana – this helps 134 
to reduce excessive load on generating plant. Investment in gas-fired thermal generation 135 
represents a favorable alternative to unreliable hydropower and costly oil-fired generation 136 
(World Bank, 2013; Ashong, 2010; Malgas, 2008). The World Bank has already invested 137 
US$700 million into the development of the Sankofa Gas Project to increase Ghana’s power 138 
generation and improve the volume of clean and inexpensive natural gas supply. It is anticipated 139 
that the guarantees will attract US$7.9 billion worth of new private investment and add 1,000 140 
megawatts (MW) of power to the national grid when completed in 2018. The development of the 141 
combined cycle gas turbine plant (located in deep water 60km offshore of Western Ghana) will 142 
facilitate gas supply through the West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP) from Nigeria and 143 
electricity costs may reduce given such investments (World Bank, 2013). Nonetheless, gas-fired 144 
projects have also encountered several challenges, most notably, delays in completing the Jubilee 145 
gas project. Furthermore, supply disruption on the West Africa Gas Pipeline (WAGP) has 146 
created a gas shortage that undermines Ghana’s gas-fired power generation potential (Foster and 147 
Pushak, 2011; World Bank, 2013).  148 
 149 
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Power Sector Restructuring 150 
Globally, recent decades have seen many countries invested hugely in liberalizing electricity 151 
markets (Erdogdu, 2013). Chile was the first country globally to implement a comprehensive 152 
electricity sector reform in 1982. Despite initial challenges regarding market structure and 153 
regulatory arrangements, the reform was successful (Pollit, 2004; Erdogdu, 2013). Joskow 154 
(2000) suggested that the persistent high price and price differentials of electricity were the 155 
driving force behind the electricity markets restructuring in several states in America. The 156 
northeast region and California were the first to restructure their power sectors in 1996 and 1997 157 
because of their much higher prices than the nation’s average (Joskow, 2006; Erdogdu, 2013). 158 
White (1996) examined the causes of this price gap and estimated its magnitude across the 159 
different states. This study (ibid) revealed dramatic differences in the price gap across states and 160 
suggested a more competitive structure for the power market in high-cost states. In New 161 
Zealand’s electricity market, Nillesen and Pollitt (2011) studied the impact of the forced 162 
ownership policy (used for unbundling electricity distribution) upon electricity prices, quality of 163 
service and costs. Their study argued that ownership unbundling did not achieve the desired 164 
results of expediting competition in the electricity supply industry; nonetheless, the reform 165 
brought about lower costs and higher quality of service.  166 
 167 
In the European Union (EU), major electricity market reforms did not occur until the EU’s first 168 
Directive to its 15 member countries in 1996; this sought to partially open their retail markets by 169 
2000 in a gradual effort to liberalize their electricity market (Trillas, 2010). By 2000, apart from 170 
Greece, all EU member countries, had opened their retail markets (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005; 171 
Pollitt, 2009). In Asia, IPPs were first allowed into the Japanese electricity industry in 1995 as 172 
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part of electricity reforms that sought to encourage cost cutting competition (Nakano and 173 
Managi, 2008). Although partially inclined, the liberalization effort has stimulated market 174 
competitions and contributed to about 30% share of total electricity demand (Asano, 2006). In 175 
Africa, most reforms implemented have been poorly designed and have mainly aimed at 176 
encouraging foreign private direct investment in power markets. South Africa is one of the few 177 
countries to have introduced a substantial reform program in their electricity industries. Initially 178 
the policy was designed to favour the minority white population group until the policy saw a 179 
fundamental shift in focus by the new democratic government in 1994 (Erdogdu, 2013). In 180 
African countries, state-run power utilities such as Energie Electrique de Côte d‘Ivoire (EECI), 181 
Société d‘Electricité du Senegal (SENELEC) and Energie du Mali (EDM) are classic examples 182 
of public institutions that have embraced private sector involvement following liberalization 183 
(UNECA, 2011). In selected market studies, Erdogdu (2013) investigated the impact of the 184 
electricity industry reforms on electricity price-cost margins using panel data from 63 developed 185 
and developing countries covering the period 1982–2009. The research (ibid) concluded that the 186 
implementation of similar reforms have different impacts across the different countries - this 187 
supports the argument that the adoption of the same reform from one country to another may not 188 
achieve similar results.  189 
 190 
In Ghana, the energy policy reforms began during the early 1990s when the Ghanaian 191 
Government sought assistance from World Bank to finance the 660 MW thermal plant located at 192 
Takoradi in the Western Region of Ghana (Wamukonya, 2003; UNCTAD, 2007). The project 193 
was financed on the basis that Ghana would reform the power sector to deliver an effective 194 
regulatory environment for promoting private investments and efficiency in internal operations 195 
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and revenue management (World Bank, 1995). On the back of this contractual obligation, the 196 
Ghana Power Sector Development Policy 1994 was developed. This policy contained a specific 197 
reform proposal, summarized by six fundamental requirements, namely to: i) introduce IPPs 198 
through Build Operate Transfer (BOT) arrangements to augment hydro and thermal generation 199 
capacities; ii) ensure transparent rules for coordinating generation and transmission operations; 200 
iii) introduce private investors into ECG’s distribution operations; iv) separate Northern 201 
Electricity Department (NED) from VRA’s transmission systems into a separate grid entity; v) 202 
introduce comprehensive regulated pricing regimes; and vi) create a regulatory body responsible 203 
for ensuring sector competition, granting licenses, regulating prices and monitoring performance 204 
agreements (PURC ACT, 1997; Malgas, 2008).  205 
 206 
Following policy reforms, VRA (which was formerly responsible for all power generation and 207 
transmission in Ghana) was restructured; GRIDCo acquired its transmission assets and functions 208 
in 2008; and NED was unbundled from VRA into a separate, semi-independent, wholly owned 209 
subsidiary entity entitled NEDCo which assumed the distribution function of VRA in Northern 210 
Ghana (World Bank, 2013). This transition was encouraged by the World Bank, International 211 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international financial institutions (Erdogdu, 2014; Williams 212 
and Ghanadan, 2006a). The Bui Power Authority (BPA) took over hydropower generation at the 213 
Black Volta Basin and saw the completion of the US$790 million Bui hydroelectric plant (400 214 
MW) financed from multiple sources – namely: US$263.5 million concessionary loans from the 215 
Government of China; US$298.5 million export buyer’s credit from the Export-Import Bank of 216 
China; US$60 million from the Government of Ghana; and an additional US$168 million 217 
obtained from other project lenders (World Bank, 2013). Once state utilities were unbundled, 218 
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transparent rules and regulations were essential to maintaining competitive markets (Joskow and 219 
Schmalensee, 1983; Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005; Newbury, 2000; Pollitt, 2004; Woodhouse, 2005; 220 
Alesina, et al., 2003; Ishii and Yan 2004). However, Ghana’s power sector reform embraced: i) 221 
the Public Utility Regulatory Commission (PURC) to act as a tariff regulator and licensor and ii) 222 
the Energy Commission (EC) to independently monitor the market, without a comprehensive 223 
legal framework backing their powers (Ashong, 2010; PURC, 2007; OFGEM, 2010). A 224 
complete reform of VRA has therefore proven ineffective because it dominates power generation 225 
plant ownership in Ghana despite the reform (Malgas, 2008). The sector’s regulatory policies are 226 
predominantly politically orientated and promote a social agenda and/ or protect national 227 
industry. These myopic ‘vote winning’ policies (which include the controversial fuel price and 228 
electricity tariffs subsidies) have affected ECG’s financial sustainability. Consequently, ECG (as 229 
an off-taker) is unable to pay power producers and therefore IPP investors have been discouraged 230 
(Balouga, 2012; World Bank, 2013).  231 
 232 
Hence, Ghana’s power sector reform remains largely inconsistent and has progressed far slower 233 
than originally envisaged (Erdogdu, 2014). Consequently, the public sector continues to 234 
dominate ownership despite efforts to engender sector reform (Haney and Pollitt, 2013; Pollitt, 235 
2008).  236 
 237 
Methods and Approach  238 
This paper employed descriptive and exploratory data analysis techniques to analyze the trend of 239 
power infrastructure investments following sector restructure and reform. While descriptive 240 
analysis quantitatively summarizes features of dataset, exploratory data analysis involves the use 241 
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of graphics and visualization techniques to identify significant features of the dataset (Saunders 242 
et al., 2009; Williams, 2007; Chatfield, 1995). The econometric approach of time series analysis 243 
was adopted for forecasting future trend in electricity generation and electricity tariff.  244 
 245 
Data  246 
Secondary data was compiled from databases sourced from the World Bank Public-Private 247 
Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF)/ Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) Project, 248 
Energy Commission, VRA, GRIDCo, and Bank of Ghana from 1994 to 2014. The PPIAF/ PPI 249 
database contains power project investment information (in millions of US$) and records of the 250 
private sector’s intention to invest into large public infrastructure assets as opposed to actual 251 
disbursements. Data on projects is however, limited to these large projects. The data from the 252 
Energy Commission, VRA and GRIDCo covers energy statistics, power generation facts and 253 
figures, and IPP investments, spanning from 2000 to 2014 were used for the econometric 254 
modeling. Nonetheless, the small dataset available constitutes a limitation of the study. Once 255 
collected, data was checked for precision and then entered onto a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet 256 
and Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). All charts, graphs and analysis were 257 
produced from Microsoft Excel spreadsheet and SPSS.   258 
 259 
Econometric Modeling  260 
In order to determine the appropriate model, time series datasets were first plotted to study 261 
patterns inherent within the data. Figures 1 and 2 are scatter plots for the two types of data series 262 
consisting of electricity generation and electricity tariff over the period 2000 to 2014.  263 
 264 
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Insert Figures 1 and 2 265 
Both plots show a nonlinear trend, indicating that the underlying pattern of the datasets follow 266 
upward trends which reflects growth in electricity generation and electricity tariff over time. This 267 
type of relationship is a curvilinear trend best represented by a polynomial regression function of 268 
suitable degree, which is linear in the coefficients (Vallence and Fabrice, 2016). Following the 269 
standard linear model for time series, where it is assumed that there is some relationship between 270 
a response variable Yt and a predictor variable Xt = (Xn-1, Xn-2. . . Xn-p), which can be written in 271 
the general form:  272 
Ŷt = β0 + β1Xt + ɛt,         (1) 273 
Polynomial regression extends the linear model by adding extra predictors, obtained by raising 274 
each of the original predictors to a power in order to provide a non- linear fit to data. The general 275 
polynomial regression model can be expressed as: 276 
Ŷt = β0 + β1 Xt + β2 Xt 2 + β3 Xt 3 + … + βk Xt k + ɛt,    (2) 277 
Where Ŷt is the linear trend forecast in period t; β0 is constant; β1 is linear coefficient, β2 is 278 
quadratic coefficient, and β3 is cubic coefficient; β0 … βk are unknown fixed regression 279 
coefficients to be estimated; Xt is time period; K is the degree of the polynomial; and ɛt is the 280 
random error.  281 
 282 
Estimation Method 283 
The polynomial regression functions of any suitable degree exhibit a form of linearity in the 284 
coefficients (Vallence and Fabrice, 2016). As such, the least squares method was employed for 285 
simple linear regression to estimate coefficients β0… βk in order to produce a non-linear fit. The 286 
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overall significance of the estimation model was tested and based on the null hypothesis as 287 
against the alternative hypothesis that:  288 
H0: The proposed polynomial models of a suitable degree fit the data significantly better 289 
than linear trend model.  290 
Ha: The proposed polynomial models of a suitable degree do not fits the data significantly 291 
better than linear trend model. 292 
Diagnostic checking 293 
Diagnostic checking confirms whether the estimated model is statistically adequate or 294 
inadequate. The statistical adequacy of time series modeling involves the assumption that the 295 
error terms are independent (Tobías and Saez, 2004; Vallence and Fabrice, 2016). A violation of 296 
this assumption, known as autocorrelation, renders the parameter estimates of the forecasting 297 
model inefficient and makes the model appear better than its predictive capability (Vallence and 298 
Fabrice, 2016). To diagnose autocorrelation in our datasets, Durbin-Watson statistic was 299 
computed viz: 300 
  d = 
∑ (𝑒𝑡−𝑒𝑡−1)
2𝑇
𝑖=2
∑ 𝑒2𝑡
𝑇
𝑖=1
 301 
Where T is the number of observations; et is the error at time t. As a rough rule of thumb, if d is 302 
less than 1, the errors are positively correlated; if d is 2 or above, there is no autocorrelation; and 303 
if d is more than 3, the errors are negatively correlated. The null hypothesis was then tested 304 
against the alternative hypothesis that: 305 
H0: The proposed models have no positive autocorrelation in the data 306 
Ha: The proposed models have positive autocorrelation in the data 307 
 308 
 309 
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Forecasting Accuracy and Model Selection 310 
The accuracy of proposed models for forecasting the time series relative to the actual historical 311 
data was then assessed. Three alternative measures were adopted, namely: mean absolute 312 
deviation (MAD), mean square error (MSE) and mean absolute percentage error (MAPE). The 313 
formula for calculating each forecast error is given as follows: 314 
MAD = 
∑ |𝑌𝑡−Ŷ𝑡|
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
 315 
MSE = 
∑ |𝑌𝑡−Ŷ𝑡|
2𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
 316 
MAPE =  
∑ |
𝑌𝑡−Ŷ𝑡
𝑌𝑡
|𝑛𝑖=1
𝑛
 x 100 317 
Where Yt and Ŷt are the actual observed values and the predicted values respectively while n is 318 
the number of the predicted values. The accuracy of the forecast is evaluated based on the 319 
estimation of error; thus the smaller the value of MAD, MSE and MAPE, the better the forecast 320 
accuracy. Table 1 shows the criteria of MAPE for model evaluation based on Lewis (1982) 321 
(Shitan et al., 2010).  322 
 323 
Data Analysis and Empirical Results 324 
Descriptive and Exploratory Data Analysis 325 
Table 2 presents descriptive summary statistics for generation capacity, electricity generation, 326 
and electricity end-user tariff.  327 
Insert Table 2 328 
Overall, Ghana’s total installed electricity generation capacity at the end of 2014 was 2,814 MW. 329 
The current mean generation capacity since the integration of thermal generation capacity into 330 
the national grid is 1,963 MW, with an average annual percentage growth of 5.26%. The lowest 331 
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and highest capacities were recorded as 1,418 MW and 2,813 MW in 2000 and 2014 332 
respectively. Hydro capacity contributes 55.8% of the total generation capacity. The remainder is 333 
shared between thermal (at 44.1%) and renewable (predominantly solar at 0.1%), making 334 
hydroelectric and thermal plants the two major types of generation facilities. The Akosombo 335 
hydroelectric plant contributes 64.6% of the total hydro generation capacity. As at the end of 336 
2014, eight thermal generation plants are installed and operational. The Takoradi Power 337 
Company (TAPCO-T1), which came online in the last quarter of 2000, is the highest contributor 338 
at 26.4% of the total thermal generation; followed by Takoradi International Company (TICO-339 
T2) installed in 2013 at 17.5% and Sunon Asogli Power Plant (SAPP) installed in 2010 at 16% 340 
of the total thermal generation respectively. The 2,813 MW generates 12,963 Gigawatt hours 341 
(GWh) of energy from the twelve installed generation facilities at the close of 2014. The total 342 
and mean generations at the same period stand at 132,976 GWh and 8,865.07 GWh respectively. 343 
These statistics indicate that power generation has witnessed a major boost since the introduction 344 
of non-hydro generation facilities; with a 5% average percentage growth annually in power 345 
generation. Since the integration of non-hydro generation into the national grid, the average end 346 
user tariff per GWh stands at GHC 0.1509, with an average percentage growth of 30.32% 347 
annually. In addition, capacity, generation and tariff variables are indicate low volatile, as their 348 
standard deviations are below their means.  349 
Insert Figure 3 350 
Figure 3 compares the average end user electricity tariffs with installed capacity and power 351 
generation. The trends illustrates that the improvement in MW and GWh of power has a 352 
corresponding increase in the cost of power paid by the final consumer. Notwithstanding, power 353 
generation has suffered major setbacks during periods of low rainfall most notably during 2007 354 
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when drought plunged the country into darkness. Despite the generation short fall of hydro, 355 
generation from this source contributes 64.7% of the entire generation mix, with the Akosombo 356 
hydroelectric plant producing 77.6% of the total hydro generation. Thermal generation accounts 357 
for 35.3% of the total generation mix, with the SAPP, TAPCO-T1 and TICO-T2 accounting for 358 
27.4%, 19.5% and 15.6% respectively. Despite the huge opportunity that solar power presents, 359 
Ghana has not harnessed this green energy effectively to boost power generation (see Figure 4).  360 
Insert Figure 4 361 
The types of fuel that feed the thermal plants for power generation include: natural gas; light 362 
crude oil (LCO); and dual (natural gas and LCO) fuel. Out of the eight installed thermal plants, 363 
five (representing 62.5% of installed thermal plants) run on either LCO or natural gas; one 364 
(12.5%) uses either diesel fuel oil (DFO) or natural gas, while the remaining two plants run on 365 
natural gas and LCO. It is planned that an estimated 2,206 MW capacity will be added to the 366 
national grid, expected to come online between 2015 and 2018 (EC, 2014) (see Table 3).  367 
Insert Table 3 368 
When these additional capacity investments are made, thermal will contribute 90.7% of the 369 
expected planned projects (ibid). A 1000-megawatt (MW) thermal power plant to be built by 370 
General Electric will drive this capacity investment by contributing 52.5% of thermal generation 371 
capacity and 47.6% of total generation capacity. Renewable energy driven by solar will 372 
contributes 9.3% of total energy capacity (ibid). It is anticipated that Mere Power Nzema (Blue 373 
Energy, UK) will lead this drive by contributing 75.6% of total renewable energy. By the end of 374 
2018, total generation capacity is expected to be 5,038 MW, with planned capacity adding 43.8% 375 
to the total capacity) (see Table 2).  376 
Insert Figure 5 377 
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Figure 5 reports upon investment (US$ million) over the period 1994 - 2013. The undulating 378 
trend reflects surges and dips in investment committed between the various projects 379 
implemented, and Ghana’s economic prosperity over this period. A natural gas transmission 380 
project received the highest investment volume (US$ 590 Million) and was executed by the West 381 
African Gas Pipeline Company Ltd in 2005 whilst the project that received the lowest investment 382 
volume (US$ 100 Million) is the Osagyefo Power Barge (an electricity generation project) in 383 
2007. By capacity, the public sector entity VRA controls 74.4% of the total generation capacity 384 
while IPPs currently manage 25.6% (split into: 14.1% hydro via the BUI hydropower project; 385 
and 11.5% thermal via the Sunon Asogli power plant). At present there is no private investment 386 
in renewable generation (see Table 4).  387 
Insert Table 4 388 
The statistics regarding the preferred contractual model of entry for private sector participation 389 
are as follows: greenfield model 70% (seven); concessions 20% (two), and management and 390 
leasing 10% (one). 50% of greenfield projects have been implemented through build, own, and 391 
operate (BOO) sub-type model, while build operate and transfer (BOT) and merchant sub-type 392 
models share the remaining 20%. Concession projects have taken the forms of build, rehabilitate, 393 
operate, and transfer (BROT) (10%) and rehabilitate, operate and transfer (ROT) (10%). The 394 
management and leasing method of entry has been implemented via management contract. 395 
Notably, none of these projects were executed by the privatization model (see Figures 6 and 7). 396 
Insert Figure 6 and 7 397 
In total, about 80% of private sector participated projects have been successful with the 398 
remaining 20% being a failure. Successful projects are defined as projects that have been well 399 
executed or are in operation whilst failed projects are projects that have been either cancelled or 400 
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have experienced massive disruption and delays during construction and operation. Most of the 401 
successful projects are greenfield projects (60%) followed by concession (10%), and 402 
management and leasing contracts (10%). The 20% of failed projects are equally shared between 403 
one concession project and one greenfield projects (see Figure 8).  404 
Insert Figure 8 405 
The segment analysis reveals that 60% of all successful projects are electricity generation 406 
projects. This is probably because most PPP projects been electricity generation projects and so 407 
contractors and clients accumulate knowledge and experience iteratively from one project 408 
completed to another. The remaining 20% of successful projects are shared equally between 409 
electricity distribution and natural gas transmission projects. Curiously, all the projects that failed 410 
to reach full potential are electricity generation projects – there is no explanation for this and 411 
further research and investigation is required to determine causal factors (see Figure 9). 412 
Insert Figure 9 413 
 414 
The Results of Forecasting Models 415 
Model Fitting 416 
The summary results of the linear model and proposed polynomial model to the 6th degree for 417 
electricity generation are presented in Table 5 along with the goodness-of-fit measures. This 418 
Table reveals among other things that the R2 (coefficient of determination) values of the models 419 
ranges from 76% to 95%. The R2 measures the overall degree of the strength of association 420 
between the predicted scores and the actual series data. The results show a significant 421 
improvement of the R2 values of polynomial fits (ranging from 93% to 95%) from the linear 422 
model of 76%, indicating that the polynomials are better fit than the linear model. However, 423 
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when comparing the polynomials, it is apparent that as the number of degrees of the function 424 
increases, there is a corresponding marginal improvement in the R2 values. Moreover, fitting the 425 
polynomials of variant degrees, the F-tests display statistical significance at p ≤ 0.05, satisfying 426 
the null hypothesis that the proposed polynomial model fits the data well when compared to the 427 
linear model for electricity generation. However, based on the statistical significance of R2 and 428 
F-tests alone, it cannot be concluded with certainty that one degree of the polynomial model is 429 
better than the other.   430 
Insert Table 5 431 
Therefore to make a meaningful decision, the forecast errors of each polynomial as the basis of 432 
selecting the suitable degree are ascertained; the model with the lowest or minimized forecast 433 
errors is thus selected for forecasting. From Table 5, all the forecasting errors measures (i.e. 434 
MAD, MSE and MAPE) display a reduction in the forecast errors as the degree of the function 435 
increases from 2nd to the 4th degree but marginally deteriorated at the 5th degree and thereafter 436 
saw an improvement at the 6th degree. Therefore, since the polynomial model of 4th degree has 437 
the lowest forecasting errors it is selected for forecasting.  438 
Table 6 shows the summary results of the linear model and proposed polynomial model to the 439 
6th degree for electricity tariff. The R2 values of the models ranges from 83% of the linear model 440 
to 99% of the 6th degree polynomial model, signifying that the polynomials are better fit than the 441 
linear model. Comparison among the polynomials reveals that R2 values slightly improves as the 442 
number of degrees of the function increases. The F-tests is statistically significant at p ≤ 0.05 443 
across all the degrees, satisfying the null hypothesis that the proposed polynomial model of a 444 
suitable degree fits the data well than linear model for electricity tariff. Similarly, it cannot be 445 
concluded with certainty that one degree of the polynomial model is better than the other.   446 
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Insert Table 6 447 
However, a cursory examination of the accuracy measures shows that the polynomial model of 448 
5th degree has the minimized forecasting errors of MAD and MSE, although its MAPE (0.16%) 449 
is slightly higher than polynomial model of the 4th and 6th degrees. Thus, a polynomial model of 450 
5th degree is the selected forecasting model for electricity tariff. 451 
Diagnostic checking  452 
Diagnostic checking was conducted to examine the residuals of the selected estimated models to 453 
determine whether they are independent. When compared with other degrees, the selected 4th 454 
degree polynomial for electricity generation and 5th degree for electricity tariff have the highest 455 
Durbin-Watson statistic (d) of 2.28 and 2.27 respectively (see Table 5 and 6). It can be 456 
concluded that the residuals are independent - are not serially correlated  - and that the null 457 
hypothesis can be accepted i.e. that the selected models have no positive autocorrelation in the 458 
data. This therefore renders the models efficient for forecasting.  459 
 460 
Forecasting 461 
To select suitable models for making a medium term (three years) prediction of electricity 462 
generation and electricity tariff respectively, the estimated 4th and 5th degree polynomial 463 
equations are specified as:  464 
Ŷ = 7786 - 145.63x - 107.61x2 + 22.136x3 -0.8506x4  465 
Ŷ = - 0.1206 + 0.1833x - 0.0657x2 + 0.0104x3 - 0.0007x4 + 2E-05x5  466 
The actual and forecasted values are shown in Table 7 and Figures 10 and 11. It is observed that 467 
for the three successively years (2015 to 2017), electricity generation would decline while 468 
electricity tariff would rise. The implications for this forecast are that if additional investments 469 
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are not made to supplement hydropower, a repeat of past power crises due to generation shortfall 470 
is unavoidable.  471 
Insert Figures 10 and 11 472 
Discussion and Policy Recommendations 473 
The reform of Ghana’s power sector has witnessed an investment boost from IPPs who now 474 
contribute 726 MW of power - representing 25.6% of the total generation capacity (as at 2014). 475 
IPPs participation has created an upward surge in power generation and has filled the generation 476 
shortfall created by the Akosombo hydroelectric plant during periods of low rainfall. Despite this 477 
effort, existing generation capacity remains insufficient to address the country’s energy needs. 478 
Additional investments are urgently needed to augment the existing capacity as well as 479 
upgrading the existing transmission and distribution infrastructure to avoid the recurring power 480 
crisis. Various planned generation capacity projects must be executed over the next 5-10 years to 481 
maintaining a healthy reserve margin and ensuring the reliable operation of Ghana’s electric 482 
system. These additional investments are urgently required to ensure economic growth and cater 483 
for urbanization and population growth, and a favorable investment environment (legal, fiscal 484 
and regulatory) is fundamental to fulfilling this need (World Bank, 2013).  485 
 486 
Unlike the generation segment, both the transmission and the distribution segments have not seen 487 
any major private investments. One change in the transmission sector is the incorporation of 488 
GRIDCo in 2006 as a private limited liability company to take over the transmission assets and 489 
functions of VRA from 2008 onwards. This change has guaranteed a major  investment  boost  in  490 
developing, modernizing  and  strengthening  the  National  Interconnected  Transmission  491 
System  (NITS) to improve efficiency and reliability. Similarly, the only private sector 492 
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participation in the distribution sector was a management and leasing contract sponsored by 493 
Electricite de France 1994 to bring efficiency in electricity distribution in ECG’s operation. 494 
Since then, ECG has not received any major private investment. It is hoped that the Ghanaian 495 
Government in collaboration with Millennium Development Authority (MiDA) would carry out 496 
their plan to privatize ECG through concession in order to access the US$498 million Compact II 497 
Program funds to improve the efficiency of ECG. The current and future investments in thermal 498 
plants, coupled with unreliable hydro generation, means that thermal will dominate Ghanaian 499 
power generation. This paradigm shift will affect production costs and consequently, increase 500 
electricity tariffs. This is because the fuel sources for thermal (e.g. natural gas, light crude oil and 501 
diesel) are more expensive making the cost of thermal generation more than twice the cost of 502 
hydro-power generation. It is imperative that Ghana’s Government and IPPs direct new 503 
investments into non-hydro generation plants, particularly into renewable energy sources which 504 
are abundant, freely available and have minimal environmental impact. A concerted effort must 505 
be made to complete existing power network infrastructure developments such as the joint 506 
Ghana/ Nigerian West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP); the Jubilee gas project; and the Sankofa 507 
gas project which has the potential of producing about 1,100 MW of electricity. Apart from 508 
providing feed for thermal plants, exploiting Ghana’s plentiful natural gas resources will cater 509 
for the emergence of power barges and increasing demand for gas by the non-power sector 510 
between now and 2018. A power barge (or power ship) is a special purpose ship, on which a 511 
power plant is installed to serve as a power generation resource. This projection may not be met 512 
if prudent and timely investments are not made.  513 
 514 
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In anticipation of a gas supply shortage, most thermal plants have been retrofitted to use light 515 
crude oil. This has significant cost implications for the end user who may be required to pay 516 
higher tariffs that could be socially exclusive particularly for the poor and infirm. Such a strategy 517 
could represent political suicide for a prevailing Ghanaian government whose predecessors have 518 
failed to adequately implement a full-cost pricing policy. To date, many sector policies have 519 
rather aimed at short-term social agendas and protecting national industry (such as the subsidy of 520 
electricity tariffs). The subsidy of electricity tariffs to VALCO has had a catastrophic impact 521 
upon VRA and ECG who are unable to sell power below their true cost and have incurred losses. 522 
The implementation of the comprehensive regulated pricing regime is therefore largely 523 
redundant, as one of the policy reforms objectives. Hence, finding a suitable and politically 524 
palatable (perhaps cross-party) approach and demonstrating transparency for regulating 525 
electricity tariffs is urgently needed to attract private investment.  526 
 527 
Conclusion 528 
Ghana’s power sector reform sought to ensure an effective regulatory environment for promoting 529 
private investments and efficiency in internal operations and revenue management. Despite this 530 
effort, the power sector continues to be confronted with enormous challenges. It is imperative for 531 
the Ghanaian government to continue to reform the power sector to stimulate private sector 532 
investments in power generation plants and in upgrading of the existing transmission and 533 
distribution plants. New investments in power generation should be directed to renewable energy 534 
(such as wind and solar) and natural gas sources. These innovative generation sources have the 535 
benefits of ensuring accessible, reliable and affordable electricity for the consumer. If the 536 
government wants to achieve its generation capacity target, be power sufficient and end the cycle 537 
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of load shedding, investments in such innovative generation sources should be made. To ensure 538 
the financial sustainability of ECG, the government has pay its debt owed to ECG. This will 539 
empower ECG to improve its human and technical capacities to improve efficiency in revenue 540 
mobilization and management, and reduce the high incidence of technical losses. Future research 541 
is required to: identify mechanisms to remove or reduce direct government financing in power 542 
utility companies in Ghana; develop and administer innovative and sustainable financial models; 543 
and further investigate the business case for using a greater proportion green energy generation. 544 
Given the sensitive political nature of major reform juxtaposed against the urgent need to deliver 545 
sustainable energy generation and transmission, Ghana’s government may have to accept that 546 
cross-party collaboration is needed if a severe energy crisis is to be avoided.   547 
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Table 1: MAPE Values for Model Evaluation 718 
MAPE (%) Evaluation 
MAPE ≤ 10% High Accuracy Forecasting 
10% ≤ MAPE ≤ 20% Good  Forecasting 
20% ≤ MAPE ≤ 50% Reasonable Forecasting 
MAPE ≥ 50% Inaccurate Forecasting 
Source: Lewis (1982) cited in Shitan et al., 2010. 719 
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Table 2: Descriptive summary statistics 753 
 Obs.  Mean  SD Min. Max. Total 
Total generation  mix (GWh) 15 8865.07 2412.38 5881.00 12963.00 132976.00 
Growth rate (%) 14 0.05 0.12 -0.19 0.24 0.70 
Average end-user tariff  (GHC) 15 0.15 0.12 0.02 0.46 2.26 
Growth rate (%) 14 0.30 0.09 -0.05 1.00 4.24 
Total generation capacity (MW) 15 1963.20 433.35 1418.00 2831.00 29448.00 
Growth rate (%) 14 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.23 0.74 
Hydro generation (GWh) 15 6314.27 1459.93 3727.00 8387.00 94714.00 
Growth rate (%)  0.04 0.07 -0.34 0.7 0.60 
Thermal generation (GWh) 15 2550.33 1307.23 613.00 4634.00 38255.00 
Growth rate (%) 14 0.27 0.15 -0.62 1.43 3.76 
Renewable generation (GWh) 15 0.47 0.32 0.00 4.00 7.00 
Growth rate (%)  14 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.33 0.33 
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Table 3: Fuel Type by Plant and Planned Projects 781 
 Water LCO/ 
Natural 
Gas 
DFO/ 
Natural 
Gas 
Natural 
Gas 
LCO Solar Total Planned 
Projects 
Hydro 3 - - - - - 3  
Thermal - 5 1 1 1 - 8 2001 
Renewable - - - - - 1 1 205 
Total 3 5 1 1 1 1 12 2206 
Source: Constructed from Energy Commission’s National Energy Statistics, 2000 -2014 782 
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Table 4: Ownership Structure in Generation Capacity 815 
 VRA IPP 
Hydro 1,180 400 
Thermal 922 326 
Renewable 3 - 
Total 2,105 726 
Source: Constructed from World Bank PPIAF and PPI Project Database  816 
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Table 5: summary forecasting statistics for electricity generation 836 
Coefficients Linear 
Polynomials 
2nd degree 3rd degree 4th degree 5th degree 6th degree 
β0 5096.21 
(662.57)*** 
7672.25 
(630.35)*** 
8916.27 
(870.4)*** 
7785.96 
(1287.23)*** 
7546.22 
(2083.66)*** 
3865.38 
(3146.18) 
β1 471.11 
(72.87)*** 
-438.08 
(181.29)*** 
1244.06 
(455.93)*** 
-145.63 
(1036.44) 
164.67 
(2321.09) 
6042.61 
(4498.98) 
β2  56.82 
(11.02)*** 
178.79 
(65.12)*** 
-107.61 
(251.93) 
-226.67 
(829.63) 
-3241.91 
(2164.37) 
β3   -5.08 
(2.68) 
22.14 
(23.31) 
40.95 
(126.63) 
728.50 
(475.59) 
β4    -0.85 
(0.72) 
-2.15 
(18.61) 
-79.35 
(52.33) 
β5     0.03 
(0.21) 
4.21 
(2.81) 
β6      -0.09 
(0.06) 
       
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 
R2 0.76 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.96 
F-test 41.79*** 75.34*** 62.28*** 48.67*** 35.14*** 33.65*** 
MAD 1001.09 527.59 452.79 353.31 356.33 3.32 
MSE 12.89E05 4.01E05 3.02E05 2.65E05 2.65E05 2.07 
MAPE (%) 12.78 6.57 5.77 4.79 4.80 4.24 
d 0.62 1.78 2.27 2.28 2.27 2.44 
       
Legend: * statistically significant at ** at 95% (p<0.05) level ; standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 6: summary forecasting statistics for electricity tariff 848 
Coefficients Linear 
Polynomials 
2nd degree 3rd degree 4th degree 5th degree 6th degree 
β0 -0.0470 
(0.0284) 
0.0600 
(0.0288) 
-0.0137 
(0.0351) 
0.0180 
(0.054) 
-0.1206 
(0.0624) 
0.0617 
(0.076) 
β1 0.0247 
(0.0031) 
-0.0130 
(0.0083) 
0.0347 
(0.0184) 
0.0039 
(0.0433) 
0.1832 
(0.0695)*** 
-0.1078 
(0.0967) 
β2  0.0024 
(0.0005)*** 
-0.0049 
(0.0026) 
0.0032 
(0.0105) 
-0.0657 
(0.0248)*** 
0.0837 
(0.0465) 
β3   0.0003 
(0.0001) 
-0.0005 
(0.0010) 
0.0104 
(0.0038)*** 
-0.0236 
(0.0102)*** 
β4    0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0007 
(0.0003)*** 
0.0031 
(0.0011)*** 
β5     0.0000 
(0.0000)*** 
-0.0002 
(0.0000)*** 
β6      0.0000 
(0.0000)*** 
       
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 
R2 0.83 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.99 
F-test 62.70*** 92.92*** 99.36*** 72.12*** 103.00*** 191.27*** 
MAD 0.0367 0.0222 0.0170 0.0179 0.0135 0.0064 
MSE 0.0024 0.0008 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.0000 
MAPE (%) 45.51 27.95 11.16 0.15 0.16 0.04 
d 0.77 1.49 1.79 1.71 2.27 3.15 
       
Legend: * statistically significant at ** at 95% (p<0.05) level ; standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 7: Actual and Forecasts of the annual electricity generation electricity tariff  871 
 872 
Year 
Electricity Generation Electricity Tariff 
Actual  
Values (GWh) 
Predicted values 
(GWh) 
Actual  
Values (GHC) 
Predicted values 
(GHC) 
2000 7222 7554 0.017 0.007 
2001 7859 7228 0.034 0.056 
2002 7273 6909 0.065 0.065 
2003 5881 6681 0.071 0.062 
2004 6038 6603 0.074 0.060 
2005 6788 6717 0.073 0.069 
2006 8430 7044 0.078 0.087 
2007 6978 7584 0.097 0.113 
2008 8324 8316 0.148 0.141 
2009 8958 9199 0.148 0.168 
2010 10167 10174 0.211 0.192 
2011 11200 11157 0.245 0.216 
2012 12025 12047 0.232 0.252 
2013 12870 12722 0.307 0.321 
2014 12963 13040 0.464 0.455 
2015  12836  0.700 
2016  11927  1.119 
2017  10109  1.795 
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